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Abstract 
The Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution protects individuals from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. As technology evolves, courts must examine Fourth 
Amendment concerns implicated by the introduction of new and enhanced police 
surveillance techniques. Recent Supreme Court cases have demonstrated a trend 
towards reconsidering the mechanical application of traditional Fourth Amendment 
doctrine to define the scope of constitutional protections for modern technological 
devices and personal data. The current research examined whether public opinion 
regarding privacy rights in electronic communications is in accordance with these 
Supreme Court rulings. Results suggest that cell phone location data is perceived 
as more private and deserving of protections than other types of location data, but 
the privacy of other types of information recorded on cell phones is valued even 
more than location data. These results have implications for the police and courts 
considering how the Fourth Amendment will apply to smart phone technologies. 
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1  Introduction 
Almost all Americans (96%) have a cell phone, and most have smart 
phones (86%; Pew Research Center, 2019). Referring to these devices 
simply as “phones” is an obvious misnomer because they are fre-
quently used to record pictures and videos; save files to Cloud storage; 
wirelessly sync with computers; make payments; and provide hours of 
entertainment through social media, books, movies, and games (Ri-
ley v. California, 2014). For a growing number of Americans (approx-
imately 20%), the smart phone is the only way they access the inter-
net at home (Pew Research Center, 2019). With the modern luxury of 
smart phones comes potential for extensive and easy police surveil-
lance. It takes minimal effort and little time to aggregate small slivers 
of information from phones and other sources to develop a vivid pic-
ture of a person’s day-to-day life (Kerr, 2012), collapsing all aspects of 
a person’s life into one aggregation (DeZwart, Humphreys, & Van Dis-
sel, 2014). How do we balance our civil liberties with national security 
when the police are collecting this information? The current research 
provides information that may be helpful in answering this question 
by comparing how individuals respond to searches of electronic de-
vices and remote searches of data stored with third-parties. In addi-
tion, we examine recent US Supreme Court assumptions that individ-
uals view searches of cell phone location data as uniquely intrusive. 
1.1  The Fourth Amendment, searches, and privacy 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects US 
citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by government ac-
tors. According to the US Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment’s 
“overriding function” is to “protect personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the State” (Schmerber v. California, 
1966, p. 384, emphasis added). Thus, not all government intrusions 
are sufficiently “arbitrary” or “invasive” to trigger Fourth Amendment 
protections (Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 1989, pp. 613–614). The 
scope of constitutional protection is limited to circumstances in which 
there has been a seizure or a search. A search occurs when the gov-
ernment infringes upon “an expectation of privacy that society is pre-
pared to consider reasonable” (United States v. Jacobsen, 1984, p. 
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113). Yet, defining this phrase takes us on a winding jurisprudential 
trail through objective and subjective determinations that are diffi-
cult to pin down. 
When the Constitution was originally drafted, the country was 
largely an agrarian society concerned with the threat of soldiers tres-
passing onto private property, and communication generally required 
face-to-face interaction. Accordingly, early understandings of the 
Fourth Amendment did not focus on the privacy of communications 
or information. Although the origins of the US Postal Service date back 
to pre-colonial times, it was not until the late 19th century that the 
Supreme Court expanded its definition of a search to require a war-
rant for the government to search the contents of a sealed letter sent 
through the mail (see 1877). As time went on, technological progress 
continually complicated what it means to be secure in our persons, 
houses, papers, and effects. As a result, the focus of Fourth Amend-
ment analysis shifted from colonists’ fears of British intrusions on their 
lands and into their homes to less physical intrusions (Taslitz, 2006). 
The tangible picture of bayonet-carrying police searching through 
homes began fading in earnest in the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury, when the US Supreme Court considered the nebulous concept of 
electronic surveillance of the telephone. In Olmstead v. United States 
(1928), the defendant was suspected of bootlegging during the Pro-
hibition era; in an attempt to confirm their suspicions, the police wire-
tapped his phone without a warrant. Olmstead argued, unsuccessfully, 
that the incriminating evidence should have been excluded at his trial 
because the police violated his Fourth (and Fifth) Amendment rights. 
Although the five-justice majority denying Olmstead’s appeal relied 
on the fact that the wiretap did not physically intrude on Olmstead’s 
property, the now famous dissent by Justice Brandeis in that case laid 
the foundation for a more expansive, and often abstruse, definition 
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. In a technologically equal-
izing move, Brandeis argued that there should be no legal difference 
between reading of a sealed letter and listening to a phone conversa-
tion. He contended the Fourth Amendment requires that Americans 
have the “right to be let alone” and that “every unjustifiable intrusion 
by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the 
means employed, must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment” (p. 478).  
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For the next 40 years, the Court remained generally hostile to this 
suggestion that Fourth Amendment protections might be unrelated to 
the physical properties of the area searched. Eventually however, the 
Supreme Court rejected the pure physical trespass requirement of the 
Olmstead majority decision and adopted a privacy-centric interpreta-
tion of Fourth Amendment protections in Katz v. United States (1967). 
The Katz ruling extended Fourth Amendment protections beyond a 
limited property-rights approach to also include any place where a 
person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy” (p. 360). Justice Har-
lan’s concurring opinion provided the two-prong test the Court ad-
opted for determining when privacy expectations are reasonable. The 
first consideration is whether the individual claiming an expectation of 
privacy had an actual, subjective expectation that the searched area or 
item was private. The second consideration is whether that subjective 
expectation is one that society is willing to recognize as reasonable 
(Smith v. Maryland, 1979, p. 740). The second, objective “reasonable-
ness” portion of this test requires the courts to engage in a compli-
cated process involving integrating existing legal doctrine and con-
temporary social norms in a manner that can be consistently applied 
across various areas and technologies. 
One problem with the reasonable expectation of privacy test is 
that, in determining what society is willing to recognize as reason-
able, judges often have to rely on their own assumptions about peo-
ple’s expectations. The subjective component of the test has been re-
ferred to as a “phantom doctrine,” because the Supreme Court rarely 
even mentions it, must less bases decisions on it (Kerr, 2015, p. 114). 
Accordingly, Supreme Court jurisprudence has focused on the nor-
mative question—whether expectations of privacy are objectively rea-
sonable—and not actual expectations of privacy in determining when 
Fourth Amendment protections apply (see, e.g., Illinois v. Caballes, 
2005; United States v. Jacobsen, 1984). 
Based on judges’ general assumptions of privacy, modern jurispru-
dence defining when a Fourth Amendment “search” has occurred of-
ten relies on the distinction between searches that occur outside as 
opposed to inside spaces (e.g., out in the open versus the inside sus-
pect’s home) (see California v. Ciraolo, 1986; Kerr, 2010, 2012; United 
States v. Knotts, 1983). Defining boundaries related to access are rel-
atively easy to understand, for our homes and other items in the 
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physical world. However, the inside versus outside distinction is in-
creasingly blurry as searched items become more technological and 
virtual. For instance, is a laptop sitting open at a coffee shop search-
able because it is in “plain view”? What if its desktop image is an in-
criminating picture (Bector, 2009)? Do people have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in that picture in the same way they might in a 
picture inside their home? Do the laptop’s privacy settings matter? At 
least one court held that a suspect did not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy when police officers were able to view passwords on 
a computer screen over the suspect’s shoulder (United States v. Da-
vid, 1991); indeed, password protection on a device is not dispositive, 
but only one factor considered in determining reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy (United States v. Barrows, 2007). Clearly, the inside ver-
sus outside distinction provides very little guidance with most tech-
nological devices. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s “third-party doctrine” compli-
cates matters when the police investigate technological devices. The 
third-party doctrine is essentially the idea that a person should not 
have an expectation of privacy in something they have voluntarily 
turned over to a third party. First described in United States v. Miller 
(1976), the court there held that individuals should not have an ex-
pectation of privacy in bank records consisting of information surren-
dered to the bank because they are part of the bank’s business oper-
ations and owned by the bank. A few years later, the Supreme Court 
similarly addressed a pen register that recorded the phone numbers 
dialed by the defendant (Smith v. Maryland, 1979). Once again relying 
on the third-party doctrine and the defendant’s voluntary disclosure 
of the numbers to the telephone company, the court held that the 
pen register was not a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amend-
ment. Even prior to the explosion of social media use, Slobogin (2008) 
raised concerns about the third-party doctrine related to technology 
in the context of government and private companies data mining and 
collecting extensive amounts of personal information. 
More recent decisions by the Supreme Court suggest a rethinking 
of both the outside–inside distinction and the third-party doctrine. In 
United States v. Jones (2012) the government attached a Global Po-
sitioning System (GPS) tracker on Antoine Jones’s wife’s vehicle and 
tracked the vehicle for 28 days. Based on the tracking, the government 
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indicted Jones and others on drug trafficking conspiracy charges. The 
lower court suppressed the data from the tracker while the vehicle was 
parked at Jones’s residence, but held he had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy while the vehicle was on the public streets. However, 
the Supreme Court held that the attachment and tracking constituted 
a search under the Fourth Amendment. Although the majority opinion 
focused on traditional issues of trespass in the placing of the tracker 
device, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Jones (2012) noted that 
physical trespass is unnecessary for most modern surveillance tech-
niques (including GPS tracking on the phone), yet they can cheaply 
provide a unique set of private information (e.g., “trips to the psychi-
atrist, the plastic surgeon” p. 415). Justice  Sotomayor asked whether 
people reasonably expect that “their movements will be recorded and 
aggregated in a manner that enables the government to ascertain, 
more or less at will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, 
and so on” (p. 416). Additionally, she questioned the use of the third-
party doctrine in the “digital age” (p. 417). 
Consistent with Justice Sotomayor’s concerns about the amount 
of information shared through technology, two years after Jones 
the court unanimously held that police cannot search arrestees’ cell 
phones without a warrant (Riley v. California, 2014). Although a war-
rantless search incident to arrest is permitted in most circumstances, 
the court reasoned that neither the fear of evidence destruction nor 
police protection was an appropriate justification for searching an ar-
restee’s cell phone. Recognizing the vast amount of information stored 
on cell phones, the court noted that they contain a “digital record of 
nearly every aspect of [the suspects’] lives— from the mundane to the 
intimate” (p. 19). The court distinguished cell phones as different in 
“both a quantitative and qualitative sense” than other items found on 
arrestees, because cell phones are effectively minicomputers that can 
also make phone calls (p. 17). The unanimous court clearly viewed cell 
phones as a new category of item that could not be equated to phys-
ical papers or other items that had been addressed in previous cases. 
The infrastructure that supports the way that modern, internet con-
nected technology functions further frustrates attempts to translate 
these traditional principles into workable Fourth Amendment doc-
trine. Whenever we use the internet to send an email or post online, 
we communicate with and through that remote computer to contact 
Marshall  et  al .  in  Behav ioral  Sc i ences  &  the  Law 37  (2019 )        7
other computers (Kerr, 2004). Our private information ends up be-
ing sent to third parties and held far away on remote network servers 
(Kerr, 2004). In 1986, recognizing that judicial interpretations of exist-
ing law and legal constructs such as the third-party doctrine left indi-
viduals’ privacy at risk in light of new and emerging electronic surveil-
lance technologies, Congress enacted the Stored Communications Act 
(SCA) of 1986 as an update to the Federal Wiretap Act of 1968. This 
statute sought to create Fourth Amendment-like protection for email 
and other digital communications stored on the Internet by, among 
other things, establishing a structure and criteria for voluntary and 
involuntary disclosure of information maintained by internet service 
providers (ISPs) about their customers. It clarified the need for, and 
process for obtaining, a court order to compel ISPs to disclose cer-
tain information to law enforcement and made disclosure of informa-
tion to the FBI mandatory only upon required certification and for the 
purpose of counter-intelligence investigations. 
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States 
(2018) demonstrates how the SCA’s approach to protecting individu-
als’ privacy in information compiled incident to use of modern com-
munications technologies has been undermined by enormous ad-
vances in, and expanded popular use of, technologies after the Act’s 
passage. In Carpenter, police conducting a criminal investigation into 
a multi-state robbery acquired Carpenter’s cellsite location informa-
tion (CSLI) records pursuant to a court order issued under §2703(d) 
of the SCA 18 U.S.C. §§2701–2712. CSLI is the data cell phones send 
several times per minute to nearby cell towers. Such data from multi-
ple cell towers can help triangulate a cell phone’s location with great 
accuracy, especially in urban areas where there is a high concentra-
tion of cell towers. Wireless carriers collect and store the CSLI for 
their business purposes and without specific notice to the user. Under 
§2703(d) of the SCA, the government was only required to show “rea-
sonable grounds to believe that records sought are relevant and ma-
terial to an ongoing criminal investigation” (p. 2230). Such a showing 
is less stringent than the normal probable cause required to obtain 
a warrant. In investigating Carpenter, the government obtained such 
a court order to compel his wireless service carrier to turn over CSLI 
data that contained his public and private movements, as tracked by 
his cell phone pings, over a four-month period. These records included 
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12,898 individual cell-site location points, including data points that 
placed Carpenter’s phone near four robbery locations at the time 
of the robberies. Using these location points as evidence, Carpenter 
was charged with multiple counts of robbery and carrying a firearm. 
Carpenter’s legal team moved to suppress the CSLI on the ground 
that the government had not obtained a warrant. In response, the 
government countered that the records were properly obtained un-
der a §2703(d) order because they were not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment under the third-party doctrine.  
The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with Carpenter, holding that 
accessing the record of the defendant’s movements in the form of 
his historical cell-site records was a search, and that therefore the 
police were required to obtain a search warrant before doing so. Al-
though CSLI data would seem similar to traditional third-party data, 
the Court declined to extend Miller and Smith, noting that the CSLI 
data allowed the police to have a “detailed, encyclopedic, and effort-
lessly compiled” record (p. 2216). “There is a world of difference be-
tween the limited types of personal information addressed in Smith 
and Miller and the exhaustive chronicle of location information ca-
sually collected by wireless carriers today…. […] this is not a straight-
forward application of the third-party doctrine,” but instead a signif-
icant extension of it to a “distinct category of information” (p. 2219). 
The court concluded that the government should have obtained a 
warrant rather than relying on the 2703(d) order, because the Fourth 
Amendment is meant to protect the “privacies of life” and “to place 
obstacles in the way of a too permeating police surveillance” (p. 2214). 
Applying the third-party doctrine would “fail[] to contend with the 
seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the tracking of 
not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a short 
period but for years and years” (p. 2219). The court further observed 
that “[i]n fact, historical cell-site records present even greater pri-
vacy concerns than the GPS monitoring of a vehicle we considered in 
Jones. Unlike the bugged container in Knotts or the car in Jones, a cell 
phone – almost a feature of human anatomy—tracks nearly exactly 
the movements of its owner. While individuals regularly leave their 
vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time” 
(p. 2218). The “[r]etrospective quality of the data here gives police ac-
cess to a category of information otherwise unknowable” (p. 2218). 
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Since Carpenter, scholars have suggested principles to guide lower 
courts in applying the reasoning and decision to new situations and 
technologies. According to Kerr (in press), “Carpenter signals a ma-
jor break from the traditional understanding” of focusing on the act 
that constitutes the search, and rather requires courts to examine the 
type of information that is revealed from such actions (p. 5). Kerr out-
lined three principles for a collection of information to receive Fourth 
Amendment protection under Carpenter: (i) law enforcement collects 
information using digital technology; (ii) the records are necessarily 
created when a person uses a core technology and not as a result of 
a meaningful, voluntary choice of the user; and (iii) the records reveal 
personal information, such as associations, religious beliefs, sexual 
preferences, and political views, that are beyond legitimate interests 
of a criminal investigation (p. 3). Thus, according to Kerr, pre-digital 
searches, such as security cameras, that existed before the digital age 
are not subject to the new analysis, and traditional third-party cases 
such as Smith (telephone numbers dialed) and Miller (bank records) 
still stand. Second, to receive Fourth Amendment protections under 
Carpenter, the user must not create the record through a meaning-
ful voluntary choice. However, when technology automatically cre-
ates records as a condition of using a device, as occurred in Carpen-
ter, Fourth Amendment protections fully apply. Finally, to qualify under 
Carpenter, the records must “reveal an intimate portrait of a person’s 
life typically beyond legitimate state interest” (p. 22). These personal 
truths, such as sexual preferences, medical history, and religious affil-
iation, do not tend to reveal evidence of a crime but are merely rep-
resentative of the sort of informational privacy concerns the Fourth 
Amendment ought to protect. 
Rozenshtein (2019) takes a different view of Carpenter. He com-
pletely rejects the third-party doctrine and assumes that the Fourth 
Amendment applies to any (or most) government investigations. Then, 
the level of suspicion that is required for a particular search (proba-
ble cause or something less) is tailored to various factors, including 
the invasiveness of the government actions, the public-safety inter-
ests, and the costs and benefits of the different levels of authorization. 
Rozenshtein views Carpenter as less a discussion of when the Fourth 
Amendment comes into play, and more a beginning of an examina-
tion into what level of suspicion and pre-authorization are reasonable 
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for digital searches. Other scholars (e.g., Slobogin, 2007) have previ-
ously suggested and addressed in more detail a similar graduated 
level of suspicion. 
The more recent decisions from the Supreme Court and the schol-
arly views of how they should be interpreted make re-analysis of the 
expectations of privacy test imperative. One possibly helpful source of 
this re-analysis is lay views about privacy. As noted by Kugler and Stra-
hilevitz (2016), “[w]hen there is a sharp divide between what the courts 
describe as the Fourth Amendment’s scope and what the people ac-
tually expect the Fourth Amendment’s scope to be, various problems 
arise” (p. 227). Therefore, it is useful to consider what laypeople be-
lieve about the Fourth Amendment and what they hold as private 
against police and government intrusion. We turn now to empirical 
research that has examined laypeople’s interpretations of privacy and 
government intrusion. 
1.2  Previous empirical research on privacy 
Generally, courts rely on their intuitive notions of privacy and what 
seems an appropriate expectation of such privacy. However, empiri-
cal social science research can aid in court determinations concerning 
what society is willing to recognize as reasonable (the objective prong 
of the two-prong test) by providing systematic information from soci-
ety (Chanenson, 2004). Despite this seemingly clear need, the Fourth 
Amendment has not been a key law–psychology area of research (Wy-
lie, Hazen, Hoetger, Haby, & Brank, 2018). What research has been 
done demonstrates that people’s privacy expectations differ across 
situations and search targets and that these expectations also differ 
from the expectations that courts assume people have in varying sit-
uations (Blumenthal, Adya, & Mogle, 2009; Slobogin, 2002, 2008; Slo-
bogin & Schumacher, 1993). For example, Slobogin and Schumacher 
(1993) compared lay individuals’ evaluations of search scenarios with 
the Supreme Court’s evaluations of cases addressing the same situa-
tions. For many of the 50 search scenarios presented, the participants’ 
ratings of intrusiveness matched the Fourth Amendment protections 
the court provided (Slobogin & Schumacher, 1993). However, there 
were some key differences between Supreme Court rulings and par-
ticipants’ ratings of intrusiveness. For instance, participants viewed 
Marshall  et  al .  in  Behav ioral  Sc i ences  &  the  Law 37  (2019 )        11
use of undercover agents and a dog sniff of a vehicle as fairly intru-
sive, while the Supreme Court has held that these searches do not vi-
olate reasonable expectations of privacy. 
Slobogin extended this research and the methods used to exam-
ine laypersons’ perceptions of the use of data mining (Slobogin, 2008) 
and surveillance cameras (Slobogin, 2002), compared with perceptions 
of more traditional police searches. Similar to the results of Slobogin 
and Schumacher, he found in that laypersons judged search intrusive-
ness in ways that were sometimes inconsistent with court rulings. Re-
lated to the Court’s recent rulings touching on privacy expectations for 
cell phones, laypersons thought an isolated search of a single phone 
call was less intrusive than an aggregate composite of all phone re-
cords (Slobogin, 2008). Contrary to the assumptions of the third-party 
doctrine, intrusiveness was not systematically reduced for information 
that was shared with others in some way. Instead, intrusiveness was 
more related to the type of information searched (Slobogin, 2008). 
Consistent with the findings by Slobogin and Schumacher (1993), 
Blumenthal et al. (2009) found additional evidence that contextual fac-
tors that tend to be undervalued in existing Fourth Amendment case-
law impact perceptions of search intrusiveness. Fradella et al. (2011) 
also expanded the work of Slobogin and Schumacher by by providing 
participants with more contextual information, examining the extent 
to which their participants agreed with Fourth Amendment precedent, 
and exploring demographic and attitudinal influences on participants’ 
expectations of privacy. Specifically, Fradella and colleagues were in-
terested in bodily, territorial, informational, and communications pri-
vacy. Although there were some demographic differences, in general 
their sample had a greater expectation of privacy than the court has 
endorsed. 
Of particular importance for the current study, participants in Fr-
adella et al. (2011) had strong beliefs about communication and in-
formation privacy and significantly disagreed with court holdings that 
limited or infringed on that privacy. For example, 85% of respondents 
disagreed with the Court’s analysis in Miller that no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy exists for financial information shared with a third 
party. Additionally, almost 60% of the respondents disagreed with the 
legality of a warrantless search that revealed “sexted” images from 
a teen male to a teen (underage) female. Conversely, nearly 55% of 
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those same respondents agreed with the court that the act of placing 
trash on the curb for garbage collectors relinquished any reasonable 
expectation of privacy one might have to its contents, because any-
one could easily go through the trash bags on the curb (California v. 
Greenwood, 1988). Taken together, these divergent expectations sug-
gest that traditional principles identifying when a person relinquishes 
an  expectation of privacy in physical spaces are often perceived by 
laypeople as inapplicable to understanding the privacy interests im-
plicated by a government search of electronic information or records. 
In 2015, Scott-Hayward, Fradella, and Fischer conducted another 
survey of American adults’ normative beliefs regarding the burden of 
proof that law enforcement should be required to have before con-
ducting searches of electronic information: no proof, gut instinct, rea-
sonable suspicion, probable cause, or never. The majority of partici-
pants reported they thought probable cause should be required for 
law enforcement to access location tracking data, social media pro-
files, cell phones, and email accounts. Older adults reported greater 
expectations of privacy in social media posts shared with friends, on-
line purchase history, and online television shows watched than did 
younger adults, while younger adults reported greater privacy expec-
tations in GPS location data than did older adults. Smith, Madden, and 
Barton (2016) extended this research and found, consistent with Fr-
adella and colleagues, that participants overwhelmingly disapproved 
of technologically aided governmental intrusions into physical spaces 
without a warrant, even ones the Supreme Court has explicitly endorse 
as outside the scope of Fourth Amendment protections, such as aerial 
surveillance. Consistent with court holdings in United States v. Jones 
and Riley v. California, participants disapproved of police tracking sus-
pects with a GPS tracking device or searching a cell phone. Moreover, 
relevant to the decision in Carpenter, participants were also disapprov-
ing of law enforcement tracking suspects via information shared be-
tween devices and local cell phone towers (i.e., CSLI data). 
Kugler and Strahilevitz (2016) have used public opinion surveys to 
examine whether certain law enforcement activities would “violate 
people’s reasonable expectations of privacy” (p. 246). Law enforce-
ment activities included using a car’s GPS system to locate it on pub-
lic streets without the owner’s permission. Participants were asked 
to make multiple evaluations of this type of governmental intrusion 
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based on whether the GPS was used to track a person’s movements 
for one day versus one week versus one month. For the most part, 
participants saw these activities as violating a reasonable expectation 
of privacy regardless of how long the information was collected. Ku-
gler and Strahilevitz (2017) further examined their data to determine 
how much impact the Supreme Court opinion in Riley had on public 
opinion about privacy rights. In general, there was only a slight im-
pact on public attitudes immediately after the decision for those re-
spondents who were familiar with the case, but the impact was gone 
one year later. Kugler and Strahilevitz (2017) interpreted these findings 
as evidence that normative public opinions about privacy and search 
intrusiveness are not entirely responsive to actions taken by the Su-
preme Court, as had been previously proposed by others. 
Related to the issues raised in Carpenter, Tokson (2016) surveyed 
810 community members on MTurk about their knowledge concern-
ing the privacy of their cell phone data. The results indicated that the 
majority of cell phone users are not aware that their cell phone pro-
vider collects their location data. In fact, about 15% of respondents 
believed that their data was not collected at all. Finally, only three per-
cent of respondents were aware that cell phone location data can be 
used by the government in surveillance for court cases. Overall, this 
research indicated that the public’s actual beliefs about how their cell 
phone information is used is contrary to courts’ conclusions about 
the public’s collective knowledge of cell phone data. 
Most recently, Chao et al. (2018) conducted an online survey ask-
ing participants to evaluate 18 different investigative activities on how 
intrusive the described activities were and whether there was a vio-
lation of reasonable expectations of privacy. Additionally, the scenar-
ios were described both from the first- and third-person perspective 
and the search outcome was manipulated as either evidence of crim-
inal activity found, or no evidence found. Perspective and outcome 
both significantly impacted participants’ responses concerning the 
reasonableness of the search. Replicating findings by Slobogin and 
Schumacher (1993), they found that when participants took the first-
person perspective and when no evidence was found the search was 
seen as less reasonable than when the third-person perspective was 
taken and evidence was found. Similar to previous research, the par-
ticipants of Chao et al. (2018) agreed with some of the Supreme Court 
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determinations, but not others. For example, although the court has 
restricted police use of suspicionless roadblocks (City of Indianapo-
lis v. Edmond, 2000), the participants in this study saw this technique 
as much less intrusive and only 27% thought it was a violation of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Chao et al. (2018) also focused on 
situations the court has not yet examined, such as police  obtain-
ing information from Cloud storage and other technology searches. 
Participants were especially sensitive to many of these technology 
searches, seeing them as highly intrusive. 
1.3  The current research 
Overall, previous research on perceptions of searches of technology 
indicates that people have high privacy expectations for information 
contained on their devices. While recent survey research (i.e., Chao 
et al., 2018; Kugler & Strahilevitz, 2016, 2017) is important in provid-
ing information about the beliefs of the typical innocent person, the 
questions were limited to plumbing reasonable expectations of privacy 
(Chao et al., 2018; Kugler & Strahilevitz, 2016, 2017) and intrusiveness 
(Chao et al., 2018), and did not include other measures of government 
intrusion that might provide insight into people’s reactions to tech-
nology searches, such as knowledge that the government is search-
ing or likelihood of consenting to a search. Additionally, previous re-
search has tended to present laypersons with scenarios that provided 
some combination of information about the nature of the informa-
tion searched, the investigatory techniques used to access it, and con-
text-specific details related to the quantitative or qualitative charac-
teristics of the item targeted by the search. Although all these factors 
have been identified as vital to the court’s reasonableness analysis, 
previous research tended not to investigate whether the nature of the 
item itself impacts privacy expectations and perceptions of intrusive-
ness and how privacy, consent, and notice interact. 
The purpose of the current research was to extend this research to 
compare privacy expectations and perceptions of searches for multi-
ple types of technology. Specifically, this research investigated privacy 
expectations for cell phone contents, email, Cloud storage use, GPS 
tracking, and location tracking on cell phones. In addition to exam-
ining privacy expectations for these technologies, we also examined 
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how laypersons perceive searches of these technologies in terms of 
how invasive they are, how likely it is that they could be conducted 
without the owner’s knowledge, how likely it is that they could be con-
ducted without a warrant, and how likely the owner would be to con-
sent to a search of these items. 
2  Method 
2.1  Participants 
Participants were 260 community members recruited on Mechanical 
Turk, an online work distribution website (Paolacci & Chandler, 2014). 
Although some researchers question the validity of samples derived 
from MTurk in the Fourth Amendment context (Kugler & Strahilevitz, 
2016, 2017), research indicates that participants recruited on MTurk do 
not differ significantly in their responses to surveys from other com-
munity samples in other contexts (Kees, Berry, Burton, & Sheehan, 
2017; Sheehan, 2018; Walter, Siebert, Goering, & O’Boyle, 2019). Data 
was collected in December 2017, six months prior to the Supreme 
Court handing down a decision in the Carpenter case in June 2018. 
Workers were limited to US residents. In the sample, 49.6% (n = 129) 
identified as female and 47.3% (n = 123) were male, 68.8% (n = 179) 
of the participants identified as White, 15.8% (n = 41) as Black, 5.4% 
(n = 14) as Latino/a, 5% (n = 13) as Asian, and 3.1% (n = 8) as other. 
Ages ranged from 18 to 71, with a mean age of 35.72 (SD = 11.40). 
All participants were treated according to the American Psycholog-
ical Association Ethical Principles of Psychologists and the Office of 
Human Research Protection guidelines. 
2.2  Materials and procedures 
Participants were directed to an online survey conducted using Sur-
veyMonkey. Informed consent was obtained on the first page of the 
survey. The following pages asked five overarching questions about 
their opinions regarding  privacy and police searches of electronic 
devices or remote searches of personal data that might be stored by 
third-party electronic service providers. 
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2.2.1  Devices and personal information included 
As a part of a larger survey, participants rated their expectations of 
privacy and perceptions of police intrusions on a variety of personal 
devices, electronic services, and data commonly stored on those de-
vices or by electronic service providers. Electronic devices and ser-
vices of interest included a personal cell phone, a GPS or navigation 
system in a car, public traffic-surveillance cameras, personal email ac-
counts, and Cloud data storage. Sub-categories of data associated 
with the use of email and cell phones also were included. For a per-
sonal cell phone, we asked about data that might implicate various 
information and communication privacy concerns: location-tracking 
data (i.e., CSLI), photos or videos (locally stored on device), notes or 
memos (locally stored on device), text messages, call-log history, in-
formation from calendars, health and activity tracking, and informa-
tion about financial transactions (i.e., digital wallet activity). For email, 
we asked about email messages recently stored and older emails. 
2.2.2  Expectations of privacy 
Participants first rated how much privacy they would generally expect 
for each item listed. Items were rated on Likert-type scales of 1–7, with 
7 indicating higher levels of privacy expectation. 
2.2.3  Perceptions of police searches 
Participants were then asked to consider each item and evaluate the 
intrusiveness of a hypothetical police search of that item. First, partic-
ipants rated how much they would feel that their privacy would be vi-
olated if the item were searched by the police (privacy violation) to 
assess the relative intrusiveness of searches of those items by the gov-
ernment. Second, participants rated how likely they would be to con-
sent to or to allow the police to search the item (consent), partly to as-
sess perceptions of how likely they would be to voluntarily relinquish 
that information under the sharing principle of the third-party doctrine 
and partly as an indirect measure of how strongly they felt about the 
privacy of that information. Third, participants rated how likely it is that 
the police could conduct a search of the item without their knowledge 
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(knowledge) to assess perceptions of government authority to search 
and expectations regarding government notice to a searchee. Finally, 
participants rated how likely it is that the police could conduct a search 
of the item without a search warrant (warrant) to assess perceptions 
of constitutional protections provided for each item. Participants re-
sponded to all of these questions on Likert-type scales of 1–7, with 7 
indicating higher levels of privacy violation and likelihood (e.g., likeli-
hood that the police would search without their knowledge). 
2.2.4  Technology usage, general privacy attitudes, and 
demographics 
Following the questions about police searches for the various items, 
participants were asked to answer questions about their behaviors and 
attitudes related to technological privacy more generally. Participants 
were asked to self-report how frequently they used common devices 
or services such as cell phones, email accounts, and Cloud storage on 
eight-point Likert-type scales, with 0 being “Do not use,” 1 being “not 
very often,” and 7 being “very often.” Participants also self-reported 
their willingness to share private information on internet  connected 
devices and electronic services on a 1–7 Likert-type scale, with 7 in-
dicating higher levels of private sharing. 
Additionally, participants also completed a modified scale from 
Malhotra, Kim, and Agarwal (2004) to measure attitudes towards pri-
vacy on the internet more generally. Examples of scale items included 
“When websites I visit ask me for personal information, I sometimes 
think twice before providing it,” “I’m concerned that online compa-
nies are collecting too much personal information about me,” and 
“To me, it is important to keep my privacy intact from online compa-
nies.” All items were measured on seven-point Likert-type scales, with 
higher scores indicating stronger attitudes towards protecting one’s 
privacy online. The items together were reliable (Cronbach’s α = 0.93). 
The items were averaged together to form the combined measure of 
“general privacy attitudes” (GPA) used in the following analyses (M = 
5.56, SD = 1.30). Finally, participants answered a series of demographic 
questions including their current status of employment, gender, age, 
and ethnicity. All participants were debriefed at the end of the survey 
and compensated for their participation. 
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3  Results 
3.1  Technology usage and participant characteristics 
3.1.1  Technology usage 
We used one-sample t-tests to examine how frequently participants 
used technologies of interest in the survey (comparing responses with 
the scale midpoint of 4). As shown in Table 1, participants reported 
frequently using personal cell phone devices and email, and only re-
ported moderate usage of Cloud storage accounts. For navigation as-
sistance, they reported frequently using an application on their cell 
phone device, and infrequently using a GPS or navigational system 
built into their car. We did not have specific hypotheses about the re-
lationship between participant demographics and device usage, but 
we found several correlations that should be noted and are shown in 
Table 2. Age was significantly positively related to reported personal 
cell phone and email usage but was not related to use of a Cloud stor-
age account or a GPS in the car. Gender (dummy coded, with male 
used as the reference category) was also not related to Cloud storage. 
However, there was a relationship between gender and reported us-
age of personal cell phones, email, and car GPS, such that male par-
ticipants reported being more likely to use a car GPS but less likely to 
use cell phones and email.  
Table 1 One-sample t-tests and descriptive statistics for reported frequency of technology usage 
      One-sample t-test 
 Descriptives      (comparison value = 4) 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  % do not use  t  df 
Personal cell phone  255  6.05  1.61  7.00  0.8% (n = 2)  20.39***  254 
Personal email  254  6.07  1.54  7.00  1.5% (n = 4)  21.48***  253 
Cloud storage account  252  3.78  2.43  4.00  13.8% (n = 36)  −0.145  251 
GPS or navigation system   
   via cell phone application  256  4.30  2.30  5.00  10.0% (n = 26)  2.09*  255 
   in car  254  1.85  2.52  0.00  55.0% (n = 143)  −13.57***  253 
* p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.001 
Responses were measured on eight-point Likert-type scales (0 being “Do not use,” 1 being “not very often,” 
and 7 being “very often”).  
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3.1.2  Privacy attitudes 
We also used one-sample t-tests to determine whether willingness to 
share private information on various technologies were significantly 
above or below the midpoint of the scale (scale of 1–7, midpoint = 
4). As indicated in Table 3, participants reported little willingness to 
share private information when using technology that is connected to 
the internet, and they reported making their settings private for social 
media websites, email accounts, and cell phones. Spearman’s rank or-
der correlations (see Table 2) were used to examine privacy attitudes 
and demographic factors. Age was not related to willingness to share 
private information, but it was positively related to general privacy at-
titude (GPA) scores, such that older participants reported valuing their 
privacy more. Gender (dummy coded with male used as the reference 
category) was positively related to willingness to share private infor-
mation but negatively related to GPA score, such that female partic-
ipants reported being more willing to share private information on 
the internet and valued their privacy less than males in our sample. 
Conversely, ethnicity (recoded with “white” as the reference category 
compared to “non-white”) was not significantly related to any of the 
privacy attitude or device usage variables. 
3.1.3  Technology usage and privacy attitudes 
We hypothesized that participants’ willingness to share private in-
formation and GPA scores would be related to their reported usage 
of various electronic devices or services. Contrary to the hypothe-
sis, Spearman’s rank order correlations (see Table 2) indicated that 
Table 3 One-sample t-tests and descriptive statistics for privacy attitudes 
    One-sample t-test  
 Descriptives   (comparison value = 4)
 N  Mean  SD  T df 
Willingness to share private information  254  3.59  1.56  −4.22***  253 
GPA score  254  5.11  1.61  −10.99***  252 
*** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy).    
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participants’ willingness to share private information was not signifi-
cantly related to their reported use of a personal cell phone or email 
account. Consistent with the hypothesis, willingness to share private 
information was positively correlated with usage of a Cloud storage 
account and a GPS device or navigational system in their car, such 
that the more willing they were to share private information, the more 
likely they were to use Cloud storage and GPS in their car. Conversely, 
GPA scores were not related to Cloud storage, but they were nega-
tively correlated with car GPS use, and positively correlated with usage 
of a cell phone and email usage, such that people who value privacy 
more were less likely to use a GPS but more likely to use cell phones 
and email. These results must be interpreted with caution, however, 
as only a minority of our participants actually used a car GPS system. 
3.2  Expectations of privacy and search invasiveness1 
3.2.1  Location information in third-party contexts 
Planned comparisons using a series of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests 
with a Bonferroni correction were used to examine differences in per-
ceptions of CSLI, GPS data from a car, and data recorded from public 
traffic surveillance cameras. Based on the court’s analysis in Carpen-
ter, we hypothesized that people would generally expect more privacy 
and report greater privacy violations for a police search of cell phone 
location-tracking data than for other information about their public 
movements, such as information collected by public traffic cameras 
or recorded by a GPS device in a car. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
people expected more privacy in their public movements when ob-
tained through tracking their cell phone than when recorded by traf-
fic cameras or recorded by a GPS device in a car (see Table 4). 
Also consistent with the hypothesis, people reported feeling like 
their privacy would be more violated by a police search of location-
tracking data from their personal cell phone than either traffic camera 
1 Significant skew was observed for all measures of privacy expectations and perceptions of 
police searches. To correct for significant skew, all dependent measures were transformed 
by taking the square root of their raw value. Transformations did not correct non-normal-
ity; therefore, the raw values were used in non-parametric tests rather than parametric 
tests when appropriate.  
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surveillance or a search of location-information recorded by a GPS de-
vice in a car (see Table 5). They also were less likely to consent to a 
police search of their CSLI data than places their car has been as re-
corded by traffic cameras (see Table 5). Similarly, as expected, they 
reported believing that it was more likely that location information 
recorded by traffic cameras could be searched by the police without 
their knowledge or without a warrant (see Table 6), suggesting that 
people expect less privacy for their public movements as recorded by 
traffic cameras. There were no significant differences between CSLI 
data and recorded car GPS location data on likelihood of consent 
(see Table 5) or the belief that the search could occur without a war-
rant (see Table 6). However, people rated as significantly more likely 
that the police could search CSLI data than recorded car GPS location 
data without their knowledge (see Table 6). Given the pattern of rela-
tionships between personal cell phone and car GPS device usage, it 
is unlikely that demographic characteristics provide a systematic ex-
planation for the differences observed between CSLI and GPS data.  
3.2.2  Cell phone activities in third-party contexts 
We conducted the following analyses using Friedman’s test to analyze 
differences in privacy expectations and perceptions of police searches 
across types of information recorded on a cell phone. A series of Wil-
coxon signed-rank tests using a Bonferroni correction were used as 
follow-up tests to directly compare ratings of location-tracking data 
Table 4 Expectations of privacy (CSLI versus GPS or car location information) 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Locations you have been, as tracked  260  4.81  1.98  5.00  —  —  
   by your personal cell phone (CSLI) 
Places you have been that were 257  4.23  2.17  4.00  −3.87  0.24***  
   recorded on a GPS system in your car 
Places your car has been as recorded  257  3.63  2.14  4.00  −7.23  0.45***  
   by public traffic cameras 
*** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy expected). 
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Table 5 Violation of privacy and likelihood of consent for police search (CSLI versus other GPS or car 
location information) 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Violation of privacy 
Locations you have been, as tracked by  259  5.66  1.65  6.00  —  — 
   your personal cell phone (CSLI)  
Places you have been that were  255  5.05  2.16  6.00  −4.55  0.28***  
   recorded on a GPS system in your car 
Places your car has been as recorded  256  4.34  2.25  4.00  −8.45  0.52***   
   by public traffic cameras 
Likelihood of consent 
Locations you have been, as tracked  260  3.40  2.28  3.00  —  —   
   by your cell phone (CSLI) 
Places you have been that were  254  3.62  2.38  4.00  −1.86  0.12  
   recorded on a GPS system in your car 
Places your car has been as recorded  256  3.88  2.34  4.00  −3.81  0.24***  
   by public traffic cameras 
*** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy violation or likely to 
consent).  
Table 6 Ability for police to search without the searchee’s knowledge or a warrant (CSLI versus GPS or 
car location information) 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Ability to search without knowledge 
Locations you have been, as tracked by  259  4.64  1.95  5.00  —  —  
   your cell phone (CSLI) 
Places you have been that were  255  4.29  2.09  4.00  −2.09  0.29*  
   recorded on a GPS system in your car 
Places your car has been as recorded  256  5.15  2.05  6.00  −3.99  0.18***  
   by public traffic cameras 
Ability to search without a warrant 
Locations you have been, as tracked  259  3.62  2.22  4.00  —  —  
   by your cell phone (CSLI) 
Places you have been that were  256  3.54  2.17  3.00  −0.18  0.01  
   recorded on a GPS system in your car 
Places your car has been as recorded  255  4.70  2.25  5.00  −6.17  0.39***   
   by public traffic cameras 
*p < 0.05 ; *** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more likely to occur without 
knowledge or without a warrant).   
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with the other categories of personal information associated with use 
of a cell phone device. Based on previous research on lay perceptions 
of government intrusions into cell phone devices and remote searches 
of electronic data, we predicted that privacy expectations and ratings 
of intrusiveness for different cell phone activities would be influenced 
by the nature of the particular data or information searched. 
There was a significant difference among the distributions of pri-
vacy expectations for the seven categories of personal information 
from a personal cell phone (χ2(7) = 169.732, p < 0.001, Kendall’s W 
= 0.096). People reported generally expecting less privacy for the re-
cords of locations indicating where they have been as tracked by their 
cell phone than for photos or videos, text messages, notes or memos, 
call history, calendar information, health or activity data, and infor-
mation from a digital wallet (i.e., PayPal, Google Wallet, Visa Check-
out) (see Table 7). 
There were also significant differences in ratings of how much par-
ticipants felt a police search would violate privacy across the cate-
gories of personal information from a personal cell phone (χ2(7) = 
135.782, p < 0.001, Kendall’s W = 0.076). People felt their privacy 
would be less violated by a police search of the records of locations 
tracked by their cell phone than for a search of photos or videos, text 
messages, notes or memos, calendar information, and information 
Table 7 Expectations of privacy (CSLI versus other cell phone activities) 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Locations you have been, as tracked by  260  4.81  1.98  5.00  —  —  
   your personal cell phone (CSLI) 
Other cell phone items 
Photos or videos (locally stored on device)  257  5.65  1.61  6.00  −7.54  0.47*** 
Text messages  259  5.48  1.65  6.00  −6.39  0.39*** 
Notes or memos (locally stored on device)  259  5.56  1.62  6.00  −6.82  0.42*** 
Call history (date, time, and duration 259  5.17  1.74  5.00  −3.97  0.25***  
   of recent calls) 
Information from calendars  258  5.24  1.72  6.00  −4.23  0.19*** 
Health and activity data  259  5.25  1.78  6.00  −4.74  0.29*** 
Information from a digital wallet  260  5.88 1.53  7.00  −8.70  0.54***  
   (such as PayPal, Google Wallet,  
   Visa Checkout, etc.)  
*** p < 0.001 
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy expected).    
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from a digital wallet. However, there was no significant difference be-
tween CSLI and call history or health and activity data (see Table 8). 
Significant differences also emerged in ratings of likelihood of con-
senting to a police search across the categories of personal informa-
tion from a personal cell phone (χ2 (7) = 72.76, p < 0.001, Kendall’s 
W = 0.041). People reported being more likely to consent to a police 
search of the records of locations tracked by their cell phone than a 
search of photos or videos, text messages, and information from a 
digital wallet. However, they reported being equally likely to consent 
to a search of notes or memos, call history, calendar information, 
and health or activity data (see Table 8). There was also a significant 
Table 8 Violation of privacy and likelihood of consent for police search (CSLI versus other cell phone 
activities) 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Violation of privacy 
Locations you have been, as tracked  259  5.66  1.65  6.00  —  —  
   by your personal cell phone (CSLI) 
Other cell phone items 
Photos or videos (locally stored on device)  260  5.94  1.49  7.00  −3.44  −21** 
Text messages  258  6.03  1.52  7.00  −5.08  0.32*** 
Notes or memos (locally stored on device)  259  5.46  1.78  6.00  −2.54  0.16* 
Call history (date, time, and duration  260  5.74  1.61  6.00  −1.08  0.07  
   of recent calls) 
Information from calendars  258  5.24  1.92  6.00  −4.05  0.25*** 
Health and activity data  260  5.57  1.80  6.00  −1.10  0.05 
Information from a digital wallet (such as  260  6.09  1.46  7.00  −4.88  0.30***  
   PayPal, Google Wallet, Visa Checkout, etc.) 
Likelihood of consent 
Locations you have been, as tracked  260  3.40  2.28  3.00  —  —  
   by your cell phone (CSLI) 
Other cell phone items 
Photos or videos (locally stored on device)  259  3.40  2.28  3.00  −3.69  0.23*** 
Text messages  259  3.24  2.25  3.00  −2.46  0.15** 
Notes or memos (locally stored on device)  260  3.32  2.27  6.00  −1.17  0.07 
Call history (date, time, and duration  260  3.44  2.25  3.00  −.83  0.05 
   of recent calls)  
Information from calendars  256  3.43  2.28  3.00  −.55  0.03 
Health and activity data  260  3.30  2.27  3.00  −.90  0.06 
Information from a digital wallet (such as  260  2.78  2.16  1.00  −5.51  0.34***  
   PayPal, Google Wallet, Visa Checkout, etc.) 
* p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy violation or likely to 
consent).    
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difference in perceptions of how likely it was that the police would be 
able to conduct a search across the categories of personal information 
from a personal cell phone without the searchee’s knowledge (χ2(7) = 
316.86, p < 0.001, Kendall’s W = 0.179) and without a warrant (χ2(7) = 
82.734, p < 0.001, Kendall’s W = 0.047). Participants rated it more likely 
that the police could search the records of locations tracked by their 
cell phone than photos or videos, text messages, notes or memos, 
calendar information, health or activity data, and information from a 
digital wallet without their knowledge. However, we found no signifi-
cant difference between CSLI and call history in perceptions that po-
lice could search without their knowledge (see Table 9). 
Table 9 Ability for police to search without the searchee’s knowledge or a warrant (CSLI versus other cell 
phone activities) 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Ability to search without knowledge 
Locations you have been, as tracked  259  4.64  1.95  5.00  —  —  
   by your personal cell phone (CSLI) 
Other cell phone items 
Photos or videos (locally stored on device)  258  3.64  2.10  4.00  −7.80  0.49*** 
Text messages  260  4.15  2.07  4.00  −4.83  0.30*** 
Notes or memos (locally stored on device)  259  3.53  2.08  3.00  −8.11  0.50*** 
Call history (date, time, and duration  259  4.64  1.97  5.00  −.248  0.02  
   of recent calls) 
Information from calendars  258  3.64  2.08  4.00  −7.69  0.48*** 
Health and activity data  260  3.66  2.13  4.00  −7.20  0.48*** 
Information from a digital wallet (such as  259  3.58  2.13  4.00  −7.40  0.46***  
   PayPal, Google Wallet, Visa Checkout, etc.) 
Ability to search without a warrant 
Locations you have been, as tracked  259  3.62  2.22  4.00  —  —  
   by your cell phone (CSLI) 
Other cell phone items 
Photos or videos (locally stored on device)  258   3.10   2.23   4.00   −4.49  0.28*** 
Text messages  259   3.27   2.27   3.00   −3.57  0.22*** 
Notes or memos (locally stored on device)  259   3.06   2.16   2.00  −5.11  0.32*** 
Call history (date, time, and duration  259   3.47   2.25   3.00  −1.61  0.10  
   of recent calls) 
Information from calendars  257   3.04   2.16   2.00  −5.22  0.33*** 
Health and activity data  260   3.08   2.20   2.00  −4.95  0.31*** 
Information from a digital wallet (such as  259   2.96   2.16   2.00  −5.75  0.36***  
   PayPal, Google Wallet, Visa Checkout, etc.) 
*** p < 0.001 
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more likely to occur without knowl-
edge or without a warrant).  
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Similar to police ability to search without the user’s knowledge, par-
ticipants rated it more likely that the police could search for the re-
cords of locations they have been as tracked by their cell phone than 
photos or videos, text messages, notes or memos, calendar informa-
tion, health or activity data, and information from a digital wallet with-
out a warrant. However, participants rated it equally likely that police 
would need to get a warrant for cell phone location data and call his-
tory (see Table 9). Taken together, these results indicate that people 
expect that many categories of data on their cell phone other than 
location data will remain private.   
3.3  Protections under the SCA 
3.3.1  Non-content versus content information in third-party contexts 
Based on the Court’s conclusion that the privacy interests associ-
ated with the CSLI records in Carpenter were sufficient to trigger full 
Fourth Amendment protections, we wanted to examine whether police 
searches for CSLI data are perceived as more intrusive than searches 
involving other types of information that remain accessible through a 
lesser process than a warrant. Currently, the SCA requires government 
officials to obtain a warrant to search the contents of emails stored 
by internet service providers for less than 180 days, but officials only 
need a subpoena to access emails stored for 180 days or longer. The 
Sixth Circuit has held that such subpoena-based searches do violate 
the Fourth Amendment (United States v. Warshak, 2010), but the US 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, so the subpoena 
provision of the SCA still stands. 
Specifically, we were interested in comparing evaluations of a po-
lice search of non-content information such as cell phone location-
tracking data with searches of content information such as email 
messages stored on a personal email account. Moreover, we were 
interested in comparing expectations and ratings of intrusiveness 
across items that are afforded different statutory protections under 
the SCA. From this sample, 62.3% of participants rated using their 
personal email very often (M = 6.07, SD = 1.59). A series of Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests were again used to determine if there were sig-
nificant differences between cell-location data and email items on 
these variables. Consistent with hypothesis, participants reported 
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generally expecting less privacy for the non-content records of cell 
location data than both the content records of recent email mes-
sages and older email messages (see Table 10).   
Contrary to assumptions underlying the SCA, which permits ac-
cess to records of CSLI and older email records under essentially the 
same (relatively easy-to-prove) circumstances, and contrary to Car-
penter (which requires a warrant for CSLI information), participants felt 
their privacy would be less violated by a police search of the records 
of cell-location data than for a search of their recent email messages 
and older email messages (see Table 11). There also was a significant 
difference between likelihood of consenting to a police search of the 
records of locations tracked by their cell phone and recent email mes-
sages, such that participants reported being less likely to consent to 
a search of their recent emails than to location tracking on their cell 
phones. However, there was no significant difference between like-
lihood of consenting to a police search of the records of locations 
tracked by their cell phone and older email messages (see Table 11). 
Additionally, participants rated more likely that the police could 
search the records of locations they have been as tracked by their cell 
phone than either the contents contained in their recent email mes-
sages, or older email messages, without their knowledge (see Table 
12). The same pattern emerged for ratings of how likely the police 
could conduct a warrantless search of the records of locations they 
have been as tracked by their cell phone than of their recent email 
messages, or older email messages (see Table 12).   
Table 10 Expectations of privacy (CSLI versus emails) non-content versus content information 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Locations you have been, as tracked  260  4.81  1.98  5.00  —  —  
   by your personal cell phone (CSLI) 
Recent email messages (stored for less  260  5.58  1.66  6.00  −5.95  0.37***  
   than 180 days) 
Older email messages (stored for more  259  5.53  1.57  6.00  −5.45  0.34***  
   than 180 days) 
*** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy, violation, or likely to 
consent, occur without knowledge, or occur without a warrant).  
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Table 11 Violation of privacy and likelihood of consent for police search (CSLI versus emails) non-con-
tent versus content information 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Violation of privacy 
Locations you have been, as tracked  259  5.66  1.65  6.00  —  —  
   by your personal cell phone (CSLI) 
Recent email messages (stored for less  260  5.98  1.62  7.00  −3.65  0. 23***  
   than 180 days) 
Older email messages (stored for more  260  5.91  1.66  7.00  −2.62  0.16** 
   than 180 days)  
Likelihood of consent 
Locations you have been, as tracked  260  3.40  2.28  3.00  —  — 
   by your cell phone (CSLI)  
Recent Email messages (stored for less  260  3.15  2.23  3.00  −2.21  0.14*  
   than 180 days) 
Older Email messages (stored for more  260  3.18  2.25  4.00  −1.86  0.11 
   than 180 days)  
* p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy violation or likely to 
consent).    
Table 12 Ability for police to search without the searchee’s knowledge or a warrant (CSLI versus emails) 
non-content versus content information 
      Wilcoxon signed  
 Descriptives   rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Ability to search without knowledge 
Locations you have been, as tracked  259 4.64  1.95  5.00  —  —  
   by your cell phone (CSLI) 
Recent email messages (stored for less  258  3.74  2.11  4.00  −5.87  0.37*** 
   than 180 days)  
Older email messages (stored for more  260  3.84  2.16  4.00  −5.20  0.32*** 
   than 180 days)  
Ability to search without a warrant 
Locations you have been, as tracked  259  3.62  2.22  4.00  —  —  
   by your cell phone (CSLI) 
Recent Email messages (stored for less  260  3.12  2.10  3.00  −3.42  0.01** 
   than 180 days)  
Older Email messages (stored for more  259  3.16  2.10  5.00  −3.18  0.20**  
   than 180 days) 
** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001 
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more likely to occur without knowl-
edge or require a warrant). 
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3.4  Privacy expectations and perceptions of searches for 
information stored on devices versus the Cloud 
The Supreme Court in Riley highlighted that much of the extensive in-
formation accessible on a cell phone is also now uploaded to Cloud 
storage – another third-party context. Differences between the same 
types of information stored on a personal cell phone and on personal 
Cloud storage were examined with Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. Based 
on the opinion in Riley, it was hypothesized that participants would 
expect more privacy and find searches more intrusive when they were 
asked about information stored on their cell phone as opposed to 
their Cloud storage. 
3.4.1  Cell phone device versus backup in the Cloud 
As hypothesized by the Riley Court, participants reported expecting 
more privacy for their physical cell phone device than for a back-up 
of all the information contained therein stored in the Cloud. Contrary 
to the hypothesis, however, there was not a significant difference in 
how violated participants would feel if the police were to search their 
cell phone device or a backup stored in the Cloud. At the same time, 
they reported being more likely to consent to the search of the de-
vice than a backup of their device stored in the Cloud. They thought 
it was less likely that the police could search their physical cell phone 
device than back-ups of their cell phone data stored in the Cloud with-
out their knowledge or without a warrant (see Table 13).   
Table 13 Expectations of privacy and perceptions of police search (stored on device versus Cloud) device 
or backup of data 
 Cell phone     Device back-up    Wilcoxon signed  
 (device)   (stored in Cloud)  rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Expected privacy  259  5.50  1.53  6.00  258  4.78  2.15  5.00  −4.78  0.30*** 
Violation of privacy  260  5.82  1.52  6.00  257  5.74  1.73  7.00  −.048  0.003 
Likelihood of consent  259  3.34  3.21  3.00  254  3.07  2.24  2.00  −2.41  0.15* 
Ability to search without knowledge  260  3.64  2.023  4.00  258  4.20  2.08  2.00  −3.72  0.23*** 
Ability to search without a warrant  259  3.10  2.13  3.00  257  3.44  2.23  3.00  −2.59  0.16** 
* p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy, violation, or likely to consent, occur 
without knowledge, or occur with a warrant).  
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3.4.2  Photos or videos 
Consistent with hypothesis and the Riley opinion, participants re-
ported expecting more privacy and feeling that their privacy would 
be more violated by a police search of photos or videos stored on 
their cell phone than a search of that data stored in the Cloud. How-
ever, they were equally likely to consent to a search of photos or vid-
eos stored on their device and in the Cloud. They thought that it was 
less likely that the police could search a cell phone device for photos 
or videos without their knowledge or without a warrant (see Table 14). 
3.4.3  Electronic communications 
Consistent with hypothesis and the Riley opinion, participants re-
ported expecting more privacy and feeling their privacy would be 
more violated by a police search of text messages stored on their per-
sonal cell phone device than when those same communications were 
stored in the Cloud. However, people reported being equally unlikely 
to consent to a police search regardless of whether it would be con-
ducted on their personal device or remotely in the Cloud. Similarly, 
whether the police search was on a device or in the Cloud did not im-
pact perceptions that the police could search that information with-
out their knowledge or without a warrant (see Table 15). 
Table 14 Expectations of privacy and perceptions of police search (stored on device versus Cloud). Photos 
or videos 
 Photos or videos    Photos or videos    Wilcoxon signed  
 (locally stored on device) (stored in Cloud)  rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Expected privacy  257  5.65  1.61  6.00  257  4.72  2.12  5.00  −6.59  0.41*** 
Violation of privacy  260  5.94  1.48  7.00  259  5.67  1.69  6.00  −2.41  0.15* 
Likelihood of consent  260  3.13  2.17  3.00  258  3.15  2.20  2.50  −00.27  0.01 
Ability to search without knowledge  258  3.64  2.10  4.00  257  4.36  2.01  5.00  −4.60  0.29*** 
Ability to search without a warrant  258  3.10  2.23  2.00  259  3.41  2.20  3.00  −2.78  0.17** 
* p < 0.05 ; ** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy, violation, or likely to consent, occur 
without knowledge, or occur without a warrant).   
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4  Discussion 
Technology is advancing at an increasingly fast pace, and the increas-
ing and almost ubiquitous use of smart phones is an example of how 
we rely on technology in our daily lives. As a reflection of the im-
portance of cell phones in today’s world, the Supreme Court has re-
cently grappled with the privacy related to this technology in a series 
of cases. Prior research had already accumulated consistent evidence 
showing that lay expectations of privacy and reasonableness tend to 
differ from those of the courts in certain aspects for both physical and 
electronic places, papers, and effects. However, that previous research 
had not directly examined how privacy expectations and perceptions 
of searches are related to cell phones, cell phone location data, and 
other digital sources of information. The purpose of this research was 
to examine whether laypersons’ expectations of privacy and percep-
tions of searches for cell phone location-tracking data and other in-
formational items stored on a cell phone were consistent with the 
Court’s analysis in these cases. 
As would be expected with an MTurk sample, our respondents were 
frequent users of technology devices and were therefore an informed 
group of whom to ask our questions. They also were generally protec-
tive of their privacy and not especially willing to share private informa-
tion on their cell phone devices, which is consistent with the high level 
of privacy expectations found for cell phones by Fradella et al. (2011). 
The high expectations of privacy observed for information stored on 
Table 15 Expectations of privacy and perceptions of police search (stored on device versus Cloud). Text 
messages 
 Text messages    Text messages    Wilcoxon signed  
 (locally stored on device) (stored in Cloud)  rank test 
 N  Mean  SD  Median  N  Mean  SD  Median  Wilcoxon Z  Effect size r 
Expected privacy  259 5.48 1.64 6.00 258 4.68 2.09 5.00 −5.66 0.35*** 
Violation of privacy  258 6.03 1.52 7.00 259 5.73 1.65 7.00 −2.91 0.18** 
Likelihood of consent  259 3.24 2.21 3.00 257 3.09 2.24 2.00 −1.57 0.10 
Ability to search without knowledge  260 4.15 2.07 4.00 257 4.32 2.06 5.00 −1.42 0.09 
Ability to search without a warrant  259 3.27 2.27 3.00 258 3.42 2.20 3.00 −1.49 0.09 
** p < 0.01 ; *** p < 0.001
Responses were measured on Likert-type scales of 1–7 (higher numbers indicate more privacy, violation, or likely to consent, occur 
without knowledge, or occur with a warrant).  
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a cell phone also is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Riley that smart phones contain a large amount of private informa-
tion spanning many aspects of daily life. 
In the Carpenter and Riley opinions, the Supreme Court reasoned 
that certain types of data generated by cell phones and the vast 
amount and type of information stored on cell phones raise issues of 
Fourth Amendment protection. One question raised by these deci-
sions is whether the type of information or its likely location on the 
physical device is a more important factor predicting laypersons’ pri-
vacy expectations that could be taken into account in court deci-
sion making. Our results provide some information about this type-
versus-device question. Consistent with previous research (Kugler & 
Strahilevitz, 2016; Smith et al., 2016) demonstrating that people have 
high privacy expectations for location-tracking information in gen-
eral, our participants also had high privacy expectations for location 
information in general. However, they expected more privacy, pro-
tection in the form of warrants, and notice of police search activity in 
the form of knowledge when that location information was derived 
from cell phone location data as opposed to a public traffic camera 
or GPS tracking. They also reported less likelihood of voluntarily pro-
viding CSLI information. Previous research (Slobogin & Schumacher, 
1993; Blumenthal et al., 2009) stressed the importance of consent, im-
plied or otherwise, in laypersons’ evaluations of the intrusiveness of a 
search. Participants here reported being unlikely to provide consent 
to search CSLI, which indicates that laypersons place CSLI data in a 
more protected category than other forms of location tracking they 
are likely to experience in their daily lives. People’s privacy expecta-
tions may be more dependent not so much on the type of informa-
tion collected but rather on the source and location of that informa-
tion; specifically, location information on the cell phone device may 
be considered more intimate and detailed than other types of loca-
tion information. These perceptions are consistent with the reason-
ing in Carpenter that CSLI data, even though it is released to a third 
party, provides enough private information to trigger Fourth Amend-
ment protections.   
Even though our participants felt that CSLI data was more de-
serving of protection than other types of location data, in some re-
spects they felt other content on their cell phones (i.e., pictures/videos, 
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content of texts, call history information, calendar information, health/
activity data, emails, and their digital wallet) should be entitled to even 
greater protection. A search of CSLI data was considered less of a pri-
vacy violation than a search of all of these items except call history or 
health/activity information, and was perceived as more likely to occur 
without a warrant than all of those types of cell phone information ex-
cept call histories (which are incidentally also stored with phone com-
panies in a similar manner to CSLI). 
Similar patterns of difference between perceptions of CSLI data 
and other cell phone information occurred in connection with queries 
about consent and notice of searches. Laypersons may be less likely 
to voluntarily consent to a search for information likely to be stored 
locally on a cell phone including photos, texts, and wallets than to 
disclosure of CSLI information. They may be more likely to voluntarily 
provide information about call histories, calendars, health data, and 
notes. CSLI data is perceived as more likely to be searched without the 
target’s knowledge than all other items except for call history, which 
was perceived as equally likely. These results also indicate that the Ri-
ley Court’s reasoning that all cell phone content should enjoy Fourth 
Amendment protection in the context of a search incident to arrest is 
consistent with how people view their cell phones. These results also 
indicate that courts may consider expanding Fourth Amendment pro-
tections for all data collected on cell phones. 
Another question raised by the Carpenter opinion and by the SCA 
is whether laypersons make distinctions among different types of in-
formation that are treated equally by the SCA and therefore poten-
tially by the courts. Our results indicate that participants do distin-
guish between at least two similarly treated categories of information 
under the SCA: emails and CSLI. Our participants perceived CSLI as 
less private, less violating if searched, and more likely to be searched 
without notice or a warrant. However, people reported being equally 
unlikely to consent to a search of either CSLI or email information, 
indicating that they would be reluctant to voluntarily release either 
type of information to the police in a search. Overall, laypersons’ per-
ceptions that emails should be given Fourth Amendment protection 
in the form of a warrant to search is consistent with the previous re-
search indicating that people believe the police would need proba-
ble cause to search their emails (Scott-Hayward et al., 2015). Based 
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on this research, courts may want to consider revisiting SCA-permit-
ted searches of other types of non-CSLI information. 
If the courts are going to grapple more extensively with any differ-
ences in Fourth Amendment protections for cell phone information 
stored on the actual device versus cell phone information backed up 
to Cloud storage, our results comparing privacy expectations and per-
ceptions of police searches of these items might help inform courts 
about the types of expectation laypersons have. Previous research by 
Chao et al. (2018) found that potential searches of Cloud storage were 
perceived as intrusive, and our results also demonstrate that partici-
pants have privacy expectations for Cloud storage. However, layper-
sons view Cloud storage differently and generally less likely to trig-
ger Fourth Amendment protections than information stored locally 
on their cell phones. Although participants felt equally violated by a 
search of the entire contents of their phone and a complete backup 
of that phone on the Cloud, participants felt more violation of their 
privacy from a potential search of the photos/videos and texts on 
their actual device. These effects are consistent with the Riley Court’s 
concern that identifying the privacy interests implicated by a device 
search is more challenging for an internet-connected device that uti-
lizes Cloud-computing technology to remotely store some indeter-
minant amount of its users’ data (p. 2491). 
One possible explanation of why people make these distinctions is 
psychological distance. Previous research has established that physi-
cally touching an object increases feelings of ownership and positive 
valuation of the object (Peck & Shu, 2009; Ping, Dhillon, & Beilock, 
2009) and that physical distance decreases psychological connected-
ness (Henderson, Wakslak, Fujita, & Rohrbach, 2011; Williams & Bargh, 
2008). It is possible that information contained on the physical cell 
phone, carried around obsessively (as noted in Riley), is valued more 
because of its physical connection to the user. Seen from this view-
point, the results distinguishing between privacy expectations for the 
Cloud are similar to the results for cell phone location data and cell 
phone call histories in that they all originate from the cell phone but 
are stored remotely. Other informational items such as photos, texts, 
emails, wallet contents, and health information may be viewed as 
more locally stored and therefore psychologically “closer,” even when 
they are also  stored remotely. Future research should investigate 
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whether psychological distance is a factor that contributes to layper-
sons’ expectations about Fourth Amendment protections in a manner 
that should be considered by courts when reasoning about remote 
storage connected to physical devices in the future. 
Although our research is limited by the non-representativeness of 
MTurk samples, the purpose of the current research was not to speak 
to general population beliefs, but rather to examine comparisons of 
beliefs about privacy, police surveillance, and technology. In other 
words, we are not claiming that the current research demonstrates 
public opinion on the topic, but it does shed light on how certain ex-
periences with and beliefs about technology can influence behaviors 
with that technology and expectations of privacy for the technology. 
As Kugler and Strahilevitz (2016) note, MTurk samples are question-
able for making claims about base rates but can be useful for exam-
ining the “relative intrusiveness of searches” (p. 22, fn. 29). Such in-
teractions of beliefs are important to consider in developing more 
nuanced explanations and examining these issues with representa-
tive samples as researchers and the courts grapple with understand-
ing lay conceptions of privacy. In addition, because MTurk samples 
are generally more technologically savvy than a representative sam-
ple (Kugler & Strahilevitz, 2016), our sample could also be thought 
of as providing a look into the future. As scholars (e.g., Tokson, 2016) 
have suggested, increased technological savviness could affect ex-
pectations of privacy. 
In order to maintain participants’ attention, we presented them with 
only short descriptions of the technology they were asked to rate. It 
would thus be desirable to replicate these findings with more detailed 
materials that would be more realistic to true search and privacy ex-
pectation experiences. Even better would be to examine these issues 
using an experimental design where the type of cell phone informa-
tion searched was manipulated between subjects. Additionally, con-
sidering the importance placed on the size, or pervasiveness of the 
records in the Carpenter analysis and the length of time in Jones, it 
may be important to provide more information about the quantity of 
data or records implicated and the length of time involved in a search. 
Despite these limitations, the current research provides important in-
sights into how laypersons view the privacy of the data they generate 
involuntarily and voluntarily when using the ubiquitous smart phone. 
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5  Conclusion 
Police today must adapt quickly to a world of vast and constant tech-
nological advancement. Unfortunately, the police are interacting with 
this technology as it emerges while the courts take months and even 
years to address each new piece of technology, and do so in ways that 
do not always seem consistent or in step with laypeople’s expecta-
tions of privacy. This disconnect has resulted in uncertainty about the 
extent to which the Fourth Amendment should apply to information 
shared in various emerging technology contexts. Empirical research 
such as the current study could aid courts in determining broader fac-
tors to consider in their Fourth Amendment decision making, such as 
whether the information is stored locally or remotely, and whether lay-
persons’ privacy expectations in specific types of emerging technolo-
gies should trigger their Fourth Amendment protection. 
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